We analyze the variety of A. Monteiro's tetravalent modal algebras under the perspective of two logic systems naturally associated to it. Taking profit of the contrapositive implication introduced by A. Figallo and P. Landini, sound and complete Hilbert-style calculi for these logics are presented.
Introduction and Preliminaries
The class TMA of tetravalent modal algebras was first considered by Antonio Monteiro, and mainly studied by I. Loureiro, A.V. Figallo, A. Ziliani and P. Landini. Later on, J.M. Font and M. Rius were interested in the logics arising from the algebraic and lattice-theoretical aspects of these algebras. They introduced a sequent calculus (for one of these logics) whose associated propositional logic coincides with the one defined by the matrix formed by the four-element TMA and one of its two prime filters, and to which we refer as Tetravalent Modal Logic (T ML). Independently, in [4] it was introduced a Hilbert-style propositional calculus for other logic associated to the variety TMA called T ML N (see Section 7) . This calculus belongs to the class of standard systems of implicative extensional propositional calculi, but it has the disadvantage of having two implications and so many axioms.
This paper retakes the question of studying the logical aspects of TMAs. By considering the contrapositive implication introduced by A. Figallo and P. Landini in [7] , we introduce Hilbert calculi for two logics naturally associated to TMAs, giving a solution to a problem posed in [7] . Finally, it will be shown that both logics are contained in the propositional classical logic, but they are not maximal sublogics of it. Since M 4m , the four-element TMA described below, generates the variety TMA, all the study will be done based on this simple but extremely rich structure. In the rest of this section we recall basic notions of TMAs.
A De Morgan algebra is a structure U = A, ∧, ∨, ¬, 0 where A, ∧, ∨, 0 is a distributive lattice with smallest element 0 and ¬ is a De Morgan involution, i.e., an involution that additionally satisfies De Morgan's laws: ¬¬x = x and ¬(x ∨ y) = ¬x ∧ ¬y.
A tetravalent modal algebra (TMA) is an algebra U = A, ∧, ∨, ¬, , 0 of type (2, 2, 1, 1, 0) such that its non-modal reduct U − = A, ∧, ∨, ¬, 0 is a De Morgan algebra and the unary operation satisfies the following two axioms: x ∨ ¬ x = 1, and x ∨ ¬x = x ∨ ¬x. The class of all tetravalent modal algebras constitute a variety which is denoted by TMA. Besides, TMA is generated by the four-element algebra M 4m = M 4 , ∧, ∨, ¬, , 0 where 
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0 such that ¬1 = 0, ¬0 = 1 and ¬x = x otherwise. The unary operator is defined as x = 1 if x = 1, and x = 0 otherwise. It is well-known that M 4m generates the variety TMA, i.e., an equation holds in every TMA iff it holds in M 4m . From this, it can be defined a propositional modal logic associated with the class of TMAs or, equivalently, associated to M 4m (see definitions 1.1 and 1.2 below). It is worth noting that there are several ways to relate a logic to a given class of algebras (cf. [11] ). However, in this paper we will concentrate mainly on the study of TMAs under the logical perspective of Definition 1.1. In Section 7 we shall briefly analyze another logic naturally associated to TMAs (cf. Definition 7.1).
From now on, we shall denote by Fm = F m, ∧, ∨, ¬, , ⊥ the absolutely free algebra of type (2,2,1,1,0) generated by a set V ar of variables. Consider now the following two logics: Definition 1.1. The logic of the variety TMA defined over Fm is the propositional logic L T M A = F m, |= T M A given as follows: for every set Γ∪{α} ⊆ F m, Γ |= T M A α if and only if, there is some finite set Γ 0 ⊆ Γ such that, for every U ∈ TMA and for every h ∈ Hom(Fm, U), {h(γ) : γ ∈ Γ 0 } ≤ h(α).
In particular, ∅ |= T M A α if and only if h(α) = 1 for every U ∈ TMA and for every h ∈ Hom(Fm, U). 
In particular, ∅ |= M 4m α if and only if h(α) = 1 for every h ∈ Hom(Fm, M 4m ). In this case, we say that α is valid in M 4m .
Since M 4m generates the variety TMA, it is immediate to prove: There exist other presentations for the logic M 4m , namely L 4m (Fm), T ML and M N , as we shall see in sections 2 and 3.
2 Other presentations for the logic M 4m
An interesting and deep analysis of the tetravalent modal logics associated to TMA in terms of abstract algebraic logic was proposed by J. Font and M. Rius in [9] . Within that framework, the wide notions of quasi tetravalent modal logic and tetravalent modal logic were introduced. Tetravalent modal logic M 4m appears as a particular case, and they showed that it can be characterized as a matrix logic. Specifically, consider the propositional logic L 4m (Fm) defined by the family of two matrices M 4m , {N, 1} and M 4m , {B, 1} over M 4m . Its consequence relation is defined as usual: for every set Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ F m, Γ |= L 4m (Fm) α if and only if there is some finite set Γ 0 ⊆ Γ such that
As it was proved in [9] , the logic L 4m (Fm) coincides with M 4m :
This allows a characterization of M 4m as a matrix logic defined in terms of two logical matrices. It is worth noting that, since M 4m , {N, 1} and M 4m , {B, 1} are isomorphic, L 4m (Fm) (and therefore M 4m ) can be characterized as a matrix logic in terms of a single logical matrix. In Proposition 3.2 we will give a direct proof of the characterization of M 4m by means of a single logical matrix, without using Theorem 2.1. In order to characterize M 4m syntactically, that is, by means of a syntactical deductive system, it was introduced also in [9] a sequent calculus called G. This generates a propositional logic T ML = F m, T ML defined as follows: for every set Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F m, Γ T ML ϕ iff there exists a finite set Γ 0 ⊆ Γ such that the sequent Γ 0 ϕ has a derivation in G. It was proved that the sequent calculus G is sound and complete with respect to the tetravalent modal logic M 4m , constituting therefore a proof-theoretic counterpart of it (cf. [9] ).
Remarks on M 4m as a matrix logic
We start our investigation by obtaining some results about M 4m (seen as a matrix logic) that will be useful in the sequel.
for all α ∈ Fm whose variables are in V .
Proof. The result is easily proved by induction on the length of α.
From this result we can give an easy direct proof of the characterization of the logic M 4m through a single logical matrix, without making use of Theorem 2.1.
be the logical matrices of Section 2. Then,
Proof.
Since |= M 4m is a finitary consequence relation and because of the presence of conjunction (infimum) ∧ in M 4m , it is enough to consider inferences in M 4m of the form α |= M 4m β (in case β is a theorem it is enough to consider α as ¬⊥).
Suppose that α |= M 4m β and let h ∈ Hom(Fm,
∈ {1, N }, a contradiction. Therefore, h(β) = 1 and so h(α) ≤ h(β). In every case we show that α |= M 4m β. The proof of the other equality is analogous.
In a logic, a functionally complete set of logical connectives is one which can be used to express all possible truth-tables over a given sound and complete matrix semantics. We say that a logic is functionally complete if it contains a functionally complete set of logical connectives. Next, we shall see that in M 4m the set {∨, ∧, , ¬, ⊥} is not functionally complete.
By observing that both {0, 1, N } and {0, 1, B} are subalgebras of M 4m , the following result is immediate: Remark 3.5. The De Morgan reduct of M 4m coincides with the reduct of the algebraic structure F OU R behind the well-known 4-valued Belnap's logic, namely, the reduct given by the truth-order instead of the knowledge-order (cf. [2, 1] ). Moreover, M 4m presented as M N is a modal extension of the matrix logic associated to this reduct of F OU R.
On the other hand, it is immediate that the reduct of M N to the signature ∧, ∨, , ⊥ coincides with the four-valued modal logic PM4 introduced in [3] . From Proposition 3.2, it follows that the negation-free reduct of M 4m coincides with PM4 (as consequence relations).
From Proposition 3.3 it follows that M 4m does not coincide with Lukasiewicz four-valued modal logic (see [8] ), since the latter is a modal extension of classical logic.
The contrapositive implication in M 4m
The original language of the logic of TMAs -in particular, the language of logic M 4m -does not have an implication as a primitive connective. It is a natural question to ask how to define a deductive implication in TMAs, in terms of the other operators.
Some proposal for an implication operator in TMAs appeared in the literature. I. Loureiro proposed in [13] the following implication for TMAs: x → y = ¬ x ∨ y. On the other hand, A. Figallo and P. Landini introduced in [7] an interesting implication operator for TMAs that can be defined as follows:
The main feature of the contrapositive implication is that it internalizes the consequence relation whenever just one premise is considered. Another important aspect of the contrapositive implication is that all the operations of the TMAs can be defined in terms of and 0 (cf. [7] ). In fact: 1 = (0 0); ¬x = (x 0); x ∨ y = (x y) y; x ∧ y = ¬(¬x ∨ ¬y); x = ¬(x ¬x). Additionally, an axiomatization for TMAs was given in [7] in terms of and 0 as follows. Proposition 4.1 (cf. [7] ). In every TMA it can be defined a binary operation such that the following holds:
Conversely, if an algebra with a binary operation and an element 0 satisfies (C1)-(C7), in which 1 = def 0 0, x ∨ y = def (x y) y, ¬x = def x 0, x ∧ y = def ¬(¬x ∨ ¬y) and x = def ¬(x ¬x), then the resulting structure is a TMA. It is worth noting that the classes TMA and TMA c are termwise equivalent. The main differences reside in the underlying language defining both classes and the fact that the characterization of the latter does not allow to see (because of (C4)) that in fact it is a variety. As we shall see in Section 6, the language Fm c of TMA c s is suitable to define a Hilbert-style presentation of tetravalent modal logic M 4m . In M c 4m we have a weak version of the Deduction Metatheorem with respect to the contrapositive implication. The last result shows that the contrapositive implication internalizes the consequence relation of M c 4m whenever just one premise is considered. In algebraic terms, internalizes the partial order ≤ of TMAs.
It is worth noting that it is not possible to improve Theorem 4.4 in the following sense: Proposition 4.5. In M c 4m both directions of the deduction metatheorem, with respect to , fail if more than one premise are allowed. Specifically: In this section some logical aspects of M c 4m seen as a modal, paraconsistent and paracomplete logic, will be briefly discussed.
The logic M c 4m , seen as a modal logic, has some nice properties: it satisfies the modal axioms (K), (4), (T), (B), (D) and (.3) (see [9] ). Thus, it satisfies all the modal axioms of the classical modal logic S5. Nevertheless, we can not affirm that M c 4m is a normal modal logic since the implication does not satisfy some properties of the classical implication. Additionally, by setting 0 α = def α and n+1 α = def n α for any n ∈ N (and similarly for ♦), the following well-known instance of the Lemmon-Scott schemes (cf. [12] ) holds in M c 4m , for any n, l, k, m ∈ N:
On the other hand, |= M c 4m ♦α ♦ α, as it can be easily checked.
There exist interesting similarities between Lukasiewicz's L 3 (seen as a modal logic) and M c 4m . In both logics, α and ♦α are defined by the same formulas in the respective languages, namely ¬(α ¬α) and ¬α α, respectively. Moreover, both implications ( L 3 's implication and contrapositive implication) do not satisfy the contraction law: α (α β) is not equivalent to (α β). From this, both logics satisfy the following modal principle: α (α α), which is not valid in the classical modal logic S5. It is not hard to see that M c 4m is both a paraconsistent and a paracomplete logic, and so it is non-trivial. In fact, if p and q are different propositional variables then we have that p, ¬p |= M c 4m q and |= M c 4m q ∨ ¬q. Indeed, it is enough to take an homomorphism h such that h(p) = N and h(q) = B.
As a paraconsistent logic, M c 4m is a Logic of Formal Inconsistency (LFI, cf. [6] ). In fact, it is possible to define a consistency operator
4m , •x = 1 if x ∈ {0, 1}, and •x = 0 otherwise. Notice that •α |= M 4m ¬(α ∧ ¬α) but the converse is not true, and so M 4m separates the notions of consistency and non-contradiction. As usual in the framework of LFIs, it is possible to define an inconsistency operator
α ∧ ¬α, the notions of inconsistency and contradiction can be separated in M c 4m . Recall from [6] that a logic L is boldly paraconsistent if there is not a formula β(p 1 , . . . , p n ) such that: (i) L β(γ 1 , . . . , γ n ) for some γ 1 , . . . , γ n , and (ii) α, ¬α L β(γ 1 , . . . , γ n ) for every α, γ 1 , . . . , γ n . Then, it can be proved that M c 4m is boldly paraconsistent. Concerning paracompleteness, it is interesting to notice that the schemas (α β) ∨ (β α) and α ∨ (α (β ∨ ¬β)) are valid in M c 4m . Both axioms together characterize Smetanich logic Sm, the greatest intermediate logic properly included in classical logic (cf. [10] ). However, it should be clear that M 4m is not an intermediate logic, since the implication connective does not satisfy some basic properties of intuitionistic implication.
6 A Hilbert-style presentation for M c 4m
Taking profit of Proposition 4.1, which states that the logic M 4m can be described as M c 4m just in terms of and ⊥, we will define in this section a sound and complete Hilbert-style system for tetravalent modal logic M c 4m .
Recall from Section 4 that Fm c = F m c , , ⊥ is the language of M c 4m . By we mean ⊥ ⊥; by ¬α we mean α ⊥ (thus, denotes ¬⊥); α ∨ β denotes (α β) β; α ∧ β denotes ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β); and α is an abbreviation for ¬(α ¬α).
Definition 6.1. Denote by H 4m = F m c , 1 the propositional logic defined through the following Hilbert calculus, where α, β, γ ∈ F m c , and with notations as above.
(1) A derivation of a formula α in H 4m is a finite sequence of formulas α 1 . . . α n such that α n is α and every α i is either an instance of an axiom or it is the consequence of some inference rule whose premises appear in the sequence α 1 . . . α i−1 . We say that α is derivable in H 4m , and we write 1 α, if there exists a derivation of it in H 4m .
(2) Let Γ be a set of formulas. We say that α is derivable in H 4m from Γ, and we write Γ 1 α, if either 1 α or there exists a finite, non-empty subset
Remark 6.3. From the last definition, ∅ 1 α iff 1 α. It is easy to prove that α 1 β iff 1 α β, and so a weak version of the Deduction Metatheorem is forced to be valid, which reflects Theorem 4.4. However, as stated in Proposition 4.5, the general version of the Deduction Metatheorem is not valid in M 4m and so this is basically a logic of tautologies (or theorems, from a proof-theoretical perspective). This is the case of the vast majority of modal logics studied in the literature, where a modal logic is simply presented as a set of formulas satisfying certain properties (cf. [5] ). This justifies the definition of derivation from premises in the calculus H 4m proposed above, which is similar to that used in the context of modal logics.
Recall that a structural inference rule is admissible in a logic L if its conclusion is a theorem of L provided that its premises are theorems of L.
Proposition 6.4. The following rules are admissible in H 4m :
Proof. (R1): Observe that 1 α iff 1 α, by (A10), (Nec) and (MP). Thus, assuming 1 α (β γ) it follows that 1 (α (β γ)). Then, by (MP) with (A7) it follows that 1 (β (α γ)). But then, 1 β (α γ) and so (R1) is admissible. The admissibility of rules (R2) and (R3) is proved analogously, by using (A8) and (A9), respectively.
(T): It follows from (R3) and (MP).
(R4) The proof is arduous, and is left to the patient reader.
(R5) It follows from (R4), by using basic properties of the negation ¬.
Proposition 6.5. In H 4m the following hold:
(ii) 1 α iff both 1 α and 1 α.
(i) By (A2) it follows that 1 ⊥ (α ⊥). By (R1) (cf. Proposition 6.4) it follows that 1 α (⊥ ⊥), that is, 1 α .
(ii) Assume that 1 α. Since α ( α) is an instance of (A2), then Proof. Clearly ≡ is an equivalence relation on Fm c . Suppose that α ≡ β and γ ≡ δ. Then, from the set of assumptions
. Indeed, consider the following syntactical (meta)derivation:
Analogously, from the same set of assumptions as above, it follows that
Theorem 6.7. The Lindenbaum algebra Fm c /≡ of H 4m is a contrapositive tetravalent modal algebra by defining: |α| |β| = def |α β| and 0 = def |⊥| where |γ| denotes the equivalence class of the formula γ. 
Proof. . On the other hand, it is easy to see that if an homomorphism h assigns the value 1 to the premises of an inference rule of H N 4m then it must assign the value 1 to the conclusion of the rule. Proposition 7.7. Let Γ ∪ {α} be a set of formulas in F m c . Then
Proof. Let Γ ∪ {α} ⊆ F m c , and suppose that Γ 1 α. In the case that 1 α, the result is immediate. Otherwise, there is a finite, non-empty subset {γ 1 , . . . , γ k } of Γ such that ( γ 1 ∧ . . . ∧ γ k ) α is derivable in H 4m , by Definition 6.2. Then α can be derived from {γ 1 , . . . , γ k } in H N 4m as follows: from the hypothesis γ 1 , . . . , γ k , the formulas γ 1 , . . . , γ k are obtained by (Nec). Using (Conj) repeatedly we obtain ( γ 1 ∧ . . . ∧ γ k ). Then, the derivation of ( γ 1 ∧ . . . ∧ γ k ) α in H 4m (which is also a derivation in H N 4m ) is appended. By (MP) it follows α. Therefore, Γ 2 α as desired. Notice that the converse of Proposition 7.9 is not true. For instance, p 2 p but p 1 p.
Concluding Remarks
This paper presents some novel results about the logical aspects of tetravalent modal algebras (TMAs). We focuses on the contrapositive implication operator definable in these algebras, showing that this connective allows to define in a simple way Hilbert-style presentations of two logics naturally associated to TMAs that we called M c 4m and M N 4m . As it can be appreciated along the paper, the contrapositive implication played an important role in the study of M c 4m and M N 4m . Further research on TMAs should take into account the nice properties of this operator.
